Arriving at knowledge through:
1. Perception
2. Developing in account (through the faculty of reason, see 185d and 186d)
3. Making a judgement
(notice how Kant claimed the same when reconciling empiricism with rationalism)
What is to say the above method is not the means to 'recollect' knowledge of the Forms?
I understand this method can be used to attain 'knowledge of convention' (mentioned by Matt), of which the forms are non-transcendental, but, again, what is to say this method cannot by applied to recollect the transcendent forms Plato mentions in his earlier dialogues, such as justice.
Does one begin to possess knowledge upon going through this method, and then 'has' or recollects it upon perceiving again (sensory or mentally) and recalling the judgement made, or does one possess knowledge prior to this method, and then recollects that knowledge when applying this method, and 'has' it everytime a perception is made (with the judgement)? (see198d)
Tuesday, March 10, 2009
Tuesday, March 3, 2009
Questions
Just to clarify:
First Socrates says (though he openly says that he is not claiming that these are his views) everything is in motion in the sense that everything is becoming (in two forms: passively or actively)(156-157):
Is something considered to be in motion when it is producing something to be perceived (i.e. whiteness)? Though this thing needs a perceiver to produce something to be perceived? What is perceived is always becoming for the perceiver, and what is perceiving is always becoming for what is perceived? Can something become in some way without being perceived (i.e. metal turning to rust). (This makes me curious as to what Berkeley thought about becoming as opposed to being; "to be is to be perceived", but is perception required to become?)
Later on he says there are two forms of motion: alteration and spatial movement. (181d)
Is motion referred to as becoming the same thing implied as alteration? Or are both processes of becoming?
It is interesting to note, that though everything is in motion, everything relies on two factors (passive = percipient and active = perception) to seemingly exist (or be in the state of becoming). If one of the the factors is missing, then nothing exists (?) This again seems similar to Berkeley's line of thinking. As in a rock could not move/become without providing a perception, and if it is not becoming, it is not, because everything is becoming (?) And I again ask, can anything become without being perceived or perceiving? It doesn't seem that this line of thought that Socrates brings up would allow for it.
The whole concept an active and passive factor dependent on each other to exist, "And through the intercourse and mutual friction of these two there comes to be an offspring infinite in multitude..." (156b) is very similar to what is partially being explained in Timaeus.
As far as the spatial movement goes, Socrates asks how can one ever name (or perhaps even know?) something if it is always in motion? Though something is becoming, it may be moving in slow vibrations, slow enough for one to apply a name, and develop knowledge about it, while it is in the process of becoming.
First Socrates says (though he openly says that he is not claiming that these are his views) everything is in motion in the sense that everything is becoming (in two forms: passively or actively)(156-157):
Is something considered to be in motion when it is producing something to be perceived (i.e. whiteness)? Though this thing needs a perceiver to produce something to be perceived? What is perceived is always becoming for the perceiver, and what is perceiving is always becoming for what is perceived? Can something become in some way without being perceived (i.e. metal turning to rust). (This makes me curious as to what Berkeley thought about becoming as opposed to being; "to be is to be perceived", but is perception required to become?)
Later on he says there are two forms of motion: alteration and spatial movement. (181d)
Is motion referred to as becoming the same thing implied as alteration? Or are both processes of becoming?
It is interesting to note, that though everything is in motion, everything relies on two factors (passive = percipient and active = perception) to seemingly exist (or be in the state of becoming). If one of the the factors is missing, then nothing exists (?) This again seems similar to Berkeley's line of thinking. As in a rock could not move/become without providing a perception, and if it is not becoming, it is not, because everything is becoming (?) And I again ask, can anything become without being perceived or perceiving? It doesn't seem that this line of thought that Socrates brings up would allow for it.
The whole concept an active and passive factor dependent on each other to exist, "And through the intercourse and mutual friction of these two there comes to be an offspring infinite in multitude..." (156b) is very similar to what is partially being explained in Timaeus.
As far as the spatial movement goes, Socrates asks how can one ever name (or perhaps even know?) something if it is always in motion? Though something is becoming, it may be moving in slow vibrations, slow enough for one to apply a name, and develop knowledge about it, while it is in the process of becoming.
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