It seems that in the Sophist 'that which is' implies 'being', but 'that which is not' does not imply 'non-being', because as Parmenides says, non-being cannot be known, understood, discussed, etc., and rather 'that which is not' seems to imply 'non-form' or 'false-form' (i.e. non or false beauty). I find this interesting. Though perhaps 'that which is' actually implies 'form', more than 'being', if the two can be separate; in which case it makes more sense to use the terms 'that which is' and 'that which is not' in the same context. But what if 'that which is not' implies becoming (and 'that which is', being)?
'that which is' 'that which is not'
1. being non-being
2. form non-form
3. being becoming
Can these mix and match? I think these are merely different ways for describing the same multi-faceted concepts, depending on perception and the context in which it is discussed. Although thinking about the context in which 'that which is not' is used in Sophist, it implies non-form as in something lacking a specific form, but not necessarily a copy of a form, in the process of becoming form. But in another instance, it implies false form (the false appearance of a true form?), which brings back in the notion of non-form implying a copy of a form. But is non or false beauty or justice in a state of becoming (true) beauty or justice?
Sunday, April 5, 2009
Pantheistic (Panentheistic) Monism in Parmenides
One of the underlying messages from Plato’s Parmenides is the concept of a pantheistic monist universe. This implies that there is really only one principle in the universe, which expresses itself in a multitude of ways, and therefore everything in the universe is a part of this one principle. This metaphysical breakdown reveals that the universe, (including every manifestation of the one principle), can be one, and not one, but many, simultaneously. How this is possible can partially be found in Parmenides.
Helpful to understanding this metaphysical perspective is how the unfolding of this one principle in the universe happens, which Plato explains in Timaeus.[1] The One (principle) desires to manifest itself and so labors through the task of emanating itself into the universe in a multitude of ways. As each emanation derives from the same source, every emanation is essentially that same source. To understand what Parmenides means by the One, according to this breakdown, one must look beyond the pure numerical value of the concept of oneness, though this is necessarily an important part of its nature, and perhaps the only part accessible to human rational thought. When the One desires the universe, it enters “being”, and at this moment becomes many. Timaeus explains this process as something “like” (Timaeus explains this process in metaphor because it is abstract) a sperm fertilizing an egg to create a being; save the sperm is the mind with the intention of the One, entering a receptacle, a complex substance that fertilizes the intention of the mind and produces the manifest universe; and the One now becomes multitude. The abstract (metaphysical) way in which the one is not many is when it is in a state of rest before it desires and manifests, and it becomes many when it begins the process of developing the universe. To change from one state to the other, it passes through a void, from one to many. This is permissible because though the one changes from one to many, it still remains one. It is always one; simply moving from ‘one’ to ‘one becoming many’ to ‘one as many’ (this third step is also ‘many becoming one’, eventually completing the cycle back to ‘one’). The many partake in oneness in a multitude of ways; in the abstract way, they partake, because the One is their very origin and essence. Though this abstract existence is not very clear and distinct in Parmenides, I will soon explain the other ways many partake of oneness. The one can also be one and many at different moments in the instance of perception, without really changing from one to the other, as one always remains. At one time it is perceived as one, and at another time it is perceived as many, though it actually always remains both in the purely numerical outlook.
Just as the one and many, in this breakdown, exist in the universe in both an abstract and numerical way, every element in the universe can be seen to have this same nature, setting up a microcosmic-macrocosmic universe, similar to the one Leibniz explains in his Monadologie (though Leibniz is not the father of this idea), who was himself influenced by a pantheistic monist thinker in Spinoza; this leads one to speculate if a pantheistic monism always has a microcosmic-macrocosmic feature, as all the parts are really images of the one on some fundamental level. As each emanation derives from the previous one, and essentially the source, the existence of an interrelation between parts seems plausible, as the microcosmic nature each part shares may be what make this relation and each succeeding emanation possible. Every part of the universe has its source in the One and is one part, but even that one part is a culmination of many other parts, and therefore each part mirrors the nature of the universe (“So things other than the one must be one complete whole with parts”[2]). This parallel between microcosmic elements of the universe and the greater whole of the universe in a numerical manner is clear, whether this is a sign of a more significant parallel, or a mere coincidence in this simple mathematical nature of the universe remains in question.
In Timaeus, as well as in Phaedo, when Plato refers to the soul as having the same nature as Forms, he is indicating at a more significant parallel, as it is this very parallel with the greater whole of the universe that allows one to be in a state of harmony and also leads one from becoming to being; the soul is remnant of Being and is the element that roots its source in the One.[3] Though this leads to a problem: which parts of the universe have souls, in the manner Plato describes such a component? Certainly not all of them, as not every part have access to Forms; though each part is a microcosm, it is not the soul Plato describes that entails microcosm status for all parts. Leibniz offers an interesting possibility by contending that every microcosmic part has what he calls a ‘monad’, within which every monad there is an internal mirror of the universe and also a distinct and different nature each desires to carry out which allows the universe to be in a state of harmony; harmony stemming from each monad fulfilling its desire to peak its nature, but also perhaps harmony in a way that all parts have a source in the One, and all have a mutual interest to become one, once the desire to be what it has a design to be is complete, and return back through the void to the source, and with such, each part has a parallel with the objective of the greater universe. Though for Leibniz, aside from the monads or souls of bodies that are internal mirrors of the universe, there is another element he calls spirit, or reasonable soul, which develops when monads achieve the rank of human, which mirrors, not only the entire universe, but the One or macrocosmic monad, itself, and is therefore capable of knowing the nature of the universe and imitating portions of it. [4] This appearance of the spirit answers the question as to which microcosmic parts have a more significant parallel to the macrocosm: humans. This greater parallel allows humans to actively become pure being, while other monads must wait for the ‘Great Breathe’ (One) to inhale.
With a breakdown of the very last sentence and conclusion of Parmenides, one can understand how this conclusion may point to a pantheistic monism. I will break it down in two parts, as Mary Louise Gill claims there are two conclusions in it.
“If one is not, nothing is-”[5]
This is the first and so-called “true” conclusion to Parmenides, as Gill claims, which simply implies that there is one, because there is obviously a universe before us. I think one can explain the above statement in two ways, which may essentially be the same. Firstly, before the one manifests, in the manner explained above, there is nothing, and therefore one is not. It is not yet in being, and therefore unknowable even to itself (which is the very reason of its desire to manifest), and again, is therefore nothing.
Second, for anything to exist, the One must exist, and this also applies in two ways. First, the more abstract way, everything that exists in the universe does so because of and requires the essence of the One to be its source, and manifest from the One’s desire; everything finds its existence in the One, as the One is the ‘Great Breathe’ that puts the eternal being -> becoming -> being cycle into motion. When it breathes out to manifest the universe, the lowest emanations (copies of Forms) are in a state in which they desire to become higher emanations of the One, or pure being (Forms). Second, the more understandable explanation, clear in Parmenides, that for anything to exist and be identifiable from other existing things it must hold the numerical principle of oneness, otherwise everything would be one (which is also paradoxically true) in the sense of a unified whole, and it is evident, as Parmenides points out, that we experience a world of individual units (many which hold the attribute of one).
“and also that, as it seems, whether one is or is not, it and the others both are and are not, and both appear and do not appear all things in all ways, both in relation to themselves and in relation to each other.”[6]
This is the second and so-called “false” conclusion to Parmenides. However, I will not agree that it is necessarily a false conclusion, as it shows insight into the nature of co-existing oneness, contrary to Gill’s statements.
Whether one is or is not implies that one can sometimes be known as it is, and sometimes as it is not. One always is, as it is the one true principle in the universe, before and during the presence of the universe, as it is the origin and the very universe itself, and therefore is even before the many. It is not or in a state of nothing, before manifestation; and it is simultaneously not when it manifests, as when the one enters being, it is now many. Therefore, one both is and is not when it is and when it is not.
The others (the many) are (exist) when one is to give each other a single, distinguishable identity, and when the desire of the one develops and infiltrates the universe; and the others are not when one is, as in when the one is resting before the development of the universe, and also when the others are seen as one collective whole, and therefore one, but not many. The others are when one is not, when there is visibly many, as in more than one (though this is only possible through each of the many being one unit); and the others are not when the one is not, as in when the others are perceived as a whole, without one acting as a distinguishing element between each (one) of the many, and when one is again, resting, as nothing, before the universe. Some of the statements have the same answer to break it down, because some of them are essentially pointing to the same state. When the one is perceived as not, but as in many, this is simply noted from a certain perspective. But even in these moments, one really is, to distinguish the many, and give each one its existence, and hence the one actually always is, and the many can only be at one point.
One, in relation to itself, hints at the existence of the true oneness, beyond the void of manifest existence. One in relation to many implies that there are many ones from a certain perspective, not just one whole, as the one expresses itself in multitude. Many in relation to one reveals the same thing, the many are many expressions of the same one substance. Many in relation to many can be understood as the many are obviously many expressions of the one, not one, when the universe is manifest.
One point considered, however, is the possible existence of the many as potential before the manifestation of the universe, and they would therefore always exist. This would help explain the many existing in all ways. The mysteries teach that once the desire is set in motion, it is an eternal cycle of breathing the desire out (universe as being ->becoming->being) and breathing the desire back in (universe as nothing). The one problem in this, if it were true, is the perception of the One in a state of nothingness before the universe, and potentiality implies something. But again, perhaps this doesn’t have to be all clear cut and dry as that, as it is seen in this explanation that contradiction is permissible (at least in terms of perception), and how the explanation all depends on the perception of each state, which can be from multiple angles (and nothing can simply imply potential being). To say the One has potential while resting in nothingness may not be farfetched (as if this whole layout may not seem farfetched to some), but when the One is in this state, it is across the void, or veil as some call it, and its nature cannot be known by its being or creation on the other side, obviously because its being is on the other side of the veil. Though, if we contain a microcosmic mirror of the universe, may this not also point to the possible nature of the One on the other side of the void? It will not, because the other side is not the universe, it is nothing. “If something is not, could anything belong to this thing that is not, or be of it?” - “How could it?” – “Therefore, no name belongs to it, nor is there an account of any knowledge or perception or opinion of it.”[7]
(What has been explained may be rightfully called panentheistic monism (as the One is also transcendent of the manifestation) as opposed to pantheistic, but these are just terms, and what is important is inherent in the description of this breakdown of the universe, not the name applied to it.)
[1] Plato. Timaeus. trans. Kalkavage, Peter (Newburyport, MA: Focus Publishing - R. Pullins Co.2001) p. 80 (48D-53A)
[2] Plato. Parmenides. trans. Gill, Mary Louise (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company Inc. 1996) p. 165 (157E)
[3] Plato. Timaeus. trans. Kalkavage, Peter (Newburyport, MA: Focus Publishing - R. Pullins Co.2001) p. 66 (36E-37C)
[4] Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. Monadology (and Other Philosophical Essays). Trans. Paul and Anne Martin Schrecker. (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company Inc. 1965) p. 162 (82-84)
[5] Plato. Parmenides. trans. Gill, Mary Louise (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company Inc. 1996) p.175 (166C)
[6] Plato. Parmenides. trans. Gill, Mary Louise (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company Inc. 1996) p.175 (166C)
[7] Plato. Parmenides. trans. Gill, Mary Louise (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company Inc. 1996) p.147 (142A)
Helpful to understanding this metaphysical perspective is how the unfolding of this one principle in the universe happens, which Plato explains in Timaeus.[1] The One (principle) desires to manifest itself and so labors through the task of emanating itself into the universe in a multitude of ways. As each emanation derives from the same source, every emanation is essentially that same source. To understand what Parmenides means by the One, according to this breakdown, one must look beyond the pure numerical value of the concept of oneness, though this is necessarily an important part of its nature, and perhaps the only part accessible to human rational thought. When the One desires the universe, it enters “being”, and at this moment becomes many. Timaeus explains this process as something “like” (Timaeus explains this process in metaphor because it is abstract) a sperm fertilizing an egg to create a being; save the sperm is the mind with the intention of the One, entering a receptacle, a complex substance that fertilizes the intention of the mind and produces the manifest universe; and the One now becomes multitude. The abstract (metaphysical) way in which the one is not many is when it is in a state of rest before it desires and manifests, and it becomes many when it begins the process of developing the universe. To change from one state to the other, it passes through a void, from one to many. This is permissible because though the one changes from one to many, it still remains one. It is always one; simply moving from ‘one’ to ‘one becoming many’ to ‘one as many’ (this third step is also ‘many becoming one’, eventually completing the cycle back to ‘one’). The many partake in oneness in a multitude of ways; in the abstract way, they partake, because the One is their very origin and essence. Though this abstract existence is not very clear and distinct in Parmenides, I will soon explain the other ways many partake of oneness. The one can also be one and many at different moments in the instance of perception, without really changing from one to the other, as one always remains. At one time it is perceived as one, and at another time it is perceived as many, though it actually always remains both in the purely numerical outlook.
Just as the one and many, in this breakdown, exist in the universe in both an abstract and numerical way, every element in the universe can be seen to have this same nature, setting up a microcosmic-macrocosmic universe, similar to the one Leibniz explains in his Monadologie (though Leibniz is not the father of this idea), who was himself influenced by a pantheistic monist thinker in Spinoza; this leads one to speculate if a pantheistic monism always has a microcosmic-macrocosmic feature, as all the parts are really images of the one on some fundamental level. As each emanation derives from the previous one, and essentially the source, the existence of an interrelation between parts seems plausible, as the microcosmic nature each part shares may be what make this relation and each succeeding emanation possible. Every part of the universe has its source in the One and is one part, but even that one part is a culmination of many other parts, and therefore each part mirrors the nature of the universe (“So things other than the one must be one complete whole with parts”[2]). This parallel between microcosmic elements of the universe and the greater whole of the universe in a numerical manner is clear, whether this is a sign of a more significant parallel, or a mere coincidence in this simple mathematical nature of the universe remains in question.
In Timaeus, as well as in Phaedo, when Plato refers to the soul as having the same nature as Forms, he is indicating at a more significant parallel, as it is this very parallel with the greater whole of the universe that allows one to be in a state of harmony and also leads one from becoming to being; the soul is remnant of Being and is the element that roots its source in the One.[3] Though this leads to a problem: which parts of the universe have souls, in the manner Plato describes such a component? Certainly not all of them, as not every part have access to Forms; though each part is a microcosm, it is not the soul Plato describes that entails microcosm status for all parts. Leibniz offers an interesting possibility by contending that every microcosmic part has what he calls a ‘monad’, within which every monad there is an internal mirror of the universe and also a distinct and different nature each desires to carry out which allows the universe to be in a state of harmony; harmony stemming from each monad fulfilling its desire to peak its nature, but also perhaps harmony in a way that all parts have a source in the One, and all have a mutual interest to become one, once the desire to be what it has a design to be is complete, and return back through the void to the source, and with such, each part has a parallel with the objective of the greater universe. Though for Leibniz, aside from the monads or souls of bodies that are internal mirrors of the universe, there is another element he calls spirit, or reasonable soul, which develops when monads achieve the rank of human, which mirrors, not only the entire universe, but the One or macrocosmic monad, itself, and is therefore capable of knowing the nature of the universe and imitating portions of it. [4] This appearance of the spirit answers the question as to which microcosmic parts have a more significant parallel to the macrocosm: humans. This greater parallel allows humans to actively become pure being, while other monads must wait for the ‘Great Breathe’ (One) to inhale.
With a breakdown of the very last sentence and conclusion of Parmenides, one can understand how this conclusion may point to a pantheistic monism. I will break it down in two parts, as Mary Louise Gill claims there are two conclusions in it.
“If one is not, nothing is-”[5]
This is the first and so-called “true” conclusion to Parmenides, as Gill claims, which simply implies that there is one, because there is obviously a universe before us. I think one can explain the above statement in two ways, which may essentially be the same. Firstly, before the one manifests, in the manner explained above, there is nothing, and therefore one is not. It is not yet in being, and therefore unknowable even to itself (which is the very reason of its desire to manifest), and again, is therefore nothing.
Second, for anything to exist, the One must exist, and this also applies in two ways. First, the more abstract way, everything that exists in the universe does so because of and requires the essence of the One to be its source, and manifest from the One’s desire; everything finds its existence in the One, as the One is the ‘Great Breathe’ that puts the eternal being -> becoming -> being cycle into motion. When it breathes out to manifest the universe, the lowest emanations (copies of Forms) are in a state in which they desire to become higher emanations of the One, or pure being (Forms). Second, the more understandable explanation, clear in Parmenides, that for anything to exist and be identifiable from other existing things it must hold the numerical principle of oneness, otherwise everything would be one (which is also paradoxically true) in the sense of a unified whole, and it is evident, as Parmenides points out, that we experience a world of individual units (many which hold the attribute of one).
“and also that, as it seems, whether one is or is not, it and the others both are and are not, and both appear and do not appear all things in all ways, both in relation to themselves and in relation to each other.”[6]
This is the second and so-called “false” conclusion to Parmenides. However, I will not agree that it is necessarily a false conclusion, as it shows insight into the nature of co-existing oneness, contrary to Gill’s statements.
Whether one is or is not implies that one can sometimes be known as it is, and sometimes as it is not. One always is, as it is the one true principle in the universe, before and during the presence of the universe, as it is the origin and the very universe itself, and therefore is even before the many. It is not or in a state of nothing, before manifestation; and it is simultaneously not when it manifests, as when the one enters being, it is now many. Therefore, one both is and is not when it is and when it is not.
The others (the many) are (exist) when one is to give each other a single, distinguishable identity, and when the desire of the one develops and infiltrates the universe; and the others are not when one is, as in when the one is resting before the development of the universe, and also when the others are seen as one collective whole, and therefore one, but not many. The others are when one is not, when there is visibly many, as in more than one (though this is only possible through each of the many being one unit); and the others are not when the one is not, as in when the others are perceived as a whole, without one acting as a distinguishing element between each (one) of the many, and when one is again, resting, as nothing, before the universe. Some of the statements have the same answer to break it down, because some of them are essentially pointing to the same state. When the one is perceived as not, but as in many, this is simply noted from a certain perspective. But even in these moments, one really is, to distinguish the many, and give each one its existence, and hence the one actually always is, and the many can only be at one point.
One, in relation to itself, hints at the existence of the true oneness, beyond the void of manifest existence. One in relation to many implies that there are many ones from a certain perspective, not just one whole, as the one expresses itself in multitude. Many in relation to one reveals the same thing, the many are many expressions of the same one substance. Many in relation to many can be understood as the many are obviously many expressions of the one, not one, when the universe is manifest.
One point considered, however, is the possible existence of the many as potential before the manifestation of the universe, and they would therefore always exist. This would help explain the many existing in all ways. The mysteries teach that once the desire is set in motion, it is an eternal cycle of breathing the desire out (universe as being ->becoming->being) and breathing the desire back in (universe as nothing). The one problem in this, if it were true, is the perception of the One in a state of nothingness before the universe, and potentiality implies something. But again, perhaps this doesn’t have to be all clear cut and dry as that, as it is seen in this explanation that contradiction is permissible (at least in terms of perception), and how the explanation all depends on the perception of each state, which can be from multiple angles (and nothing can simply imply potential being). To say the One has potential while resting in nothingness may not be farfetched (as if this whole layout may not seem farfetched to some), but when the One is in this state, it is across the void, or veil as some call it, and its nature cannot be known by its being or creation on the other side, obviously because its being is on the other side of the veil. Though, if we contain a microcosmic mirror of the universe, may this not also point to the possible nature of the One on the other side of the void? It will not, because the other side is not the universe, it is nothing. “If something is not, could anything belong to this thing that is not, or be of it?” - “How could it?” – “Therefore, no name belongs to it, nor is there an account of any knowledge or perception or opinion of it.”[7]
(What has been explained may be rightfully called panentheistic monism (as the One is also transcendent of the manifestation) as opposed to pantheistic, but these are just terms, and what is important is inherent in the description of this breakdown of the universe, not the name applied to it.)
[1] Plato. Timaeus. trans. Kalkavage, Peter (Newburyport, MA: Focus Publishing - R. Pullins Co.2001) p. 80 (48D-53A)
[2] Plato. Parmenides. trans. Gill, Mary Louise (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company Inc. 1996) p. 165 (157E)
[3] Plato. Timaeus. trans. Kalkavage, Peter (Newburyport, MA: Focus Publishing - R. Pullins Co.2001) p. 66 (36E-37C)
[4] Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. Monadology (and Other Philosophical Essays). Trans. Paul and Anne Martin Schrecker. (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company Inc. 1965) p. 162 (82-84)
[5] Plato. Parmenides. trans. Gill, Mary Louise (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company Inc. 1996) p.175 (166C)
[6] Plato. Parmenides. trans. Gill, Mary Louise (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company Inc. 1996) p.175 (166C)
[7] Plato. Parmenides. trans. Gill, Mary Louise (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company Inc. 1996) p.147 (142A)
Tuesday, March 10, 2009
Where are the Forms?
Arriving at knowledge through:
1. Perception
2. Developing in account (through the faculty of reason, see 185d and 186d)
3. Making a judgement
(notice how Kant claimed the same when reconciling empiricism with rationalism)
What is to say the above method is not the means to 'recollect' knowledge of the Forms?
I understand this method can be used to attain 'knowledge of convention' (mentioned by Matt), of which the forms are non-transcendental, but, again, what is to say this method cannot by applied to recollect the transcendent forms Plato mentions in his earlier dialogues, such as justice.
Does one begin to possess knowledge upon going through this method, and then 'has' or recollects it upon perceiving again (sensory or mentally) and recalling the judgement made, or does one possess knowledge prior to this method, and then recollects that knowledge when applying this method, and 'has' it everytime a perception is made (with the judgement)? (see198d)
1. Perception
2. Developing in account (through the faculty of reason, see 185d and 186d)
3. Making a judgement
(notice how Kant claimed the same when reconciling empiricism with rationalism)
What is to say the above method is not the means to 'recollect' knowledge of the Forms?
I understand this method can be used to attain 'knowledge of convention' (mentioned by Matt), of which the forms are non-transcendental, but, again, what is to say this method cannot by applied to recollect the transcendent forms Plato mentions in his earlier dialogues, such as justice.
Does one begin to possess knowledge upon going through this method, and then 'has' or recollects it upon perceiving again (sensory or mentally) and recalling the judgement made, or does one possess knowledge prior to this method, and then recollects that knowledge when applying this method, and 'has' it everytime a perception is made (with the judgement)? (see198d)
Tuesday, March 3, 2009
Questions
Just to clarify:
First Socrates says (though he openly says that he is not claiming that these are his views) everything is in motion in the sense that everything is becoming (in two forms: passively or actively)(156-157):
Is something considered to be in motion when it is producing something to be perceived (i.e. whiteness)? Though this thing needs a perceiver to produce something to be perceived? What is perceived is always becoming for the perceiver, and what is perceiving is always becoming for what is perceived? Can something become in some way without being perceived (i.e. metal turning to rust). (This makes me curious as to what Berkeley thought about becoming as opposed to being; "to be is to be perceived", but is perception required to become?)
Later on he says there are two forms of motion: alteration and spatial movement. (181d)
Is motion referred to as becoming the same thing implied as alteration? Or are both processes of becoming?
It is interesting to note, that though everything is in motion, everything relies on two factors (passive = percipient and active = perception) to seemingly exist (or be in the state of becoming). If one of the the factors is missing, then nothing exists (?) This again seems similar to Berkeley's line of thinking. As in a rock could not move/become without providing a perception, and if it is not becoming, it is not, because everything is becoming (?) And I again ask, can anything become without being perceived or perceiving? It doesn't seem that this line of thought that Socrates brings up would allow for it.
The whole concept an active and passive factor dependent on each other to exist, "And through the intercourse and mutual friction of these two there comes to be an offspring infinite in multitude..." (156b) is very similar to what is partially being explained in Timaeus.
As far as the spatial movement goes, Socrates asks how can one ever name (or perhaps even know?) something if it is always in motion? Though something is becoming, it may be moving in slow vibrations, slow enough for one to apply a name, and develop knowledge about it, while it is in the process of becoming.
First Socrates says (though he openly says that he is not claiming that these are his views) everything is in motion in the sense that everything is becoming (in two forms: passively or actively)(156-157):
Is something considered to be in motion when it is producing something to be perceived (i.e. whiteness)? Though this thing needs a perceiver to produce something to be perceived? What is perceived is always becoming for the perceiver, and what is perceiving is always becoming for what is perceived? Can something become in some way without being perceived (i.e. metal turning to rust). (This makes me curious as to what Berkeley thought about becoming as opposed to being; "to be is to be perceived", but is perception required to become?)
Later on he says there are two forms of motion: alteration and spatial movement. (181d)
Is motion referred to as becoming the same thing implied as alteration? Or are both processes of becoming?
It is interesting to note, that though everything is in motion, everything relies on two factors (passive = percipient and active = perception) to seemingly exist (or be in the state of becoming). If one of the the factors is missing, then nothing exists (?) This again seems similar to Berkeley's line of thinking. As in a rock could not move/become without providing a perception, and if it is not becoming, it is not, because everything is becoming (?) And I again ask, can anything become without being perceived or perceiving? It doesn't seem that this line of thought that Socrates brings up would allow for it.
The whole concept an active and passive factor dependent on each other to exist, "And through the intercourse and mutual friction of these two there comes to be an offspring infinite in multitude..." (156b) is very similar to what is partially being explained in Timaeus.
As far as the spatial movement goes, Socrates asks how can one ever name (or perhaps even know?) something if it is always in motion? Though something is becoming, it may be moving in slow vibrations, slow enough for one to apply a name, and develop knowledge about it, while it is in the process of becoming.
Monday, February 23, 2009
String of Thought
A series of thoughts I had from last class: Is there such a thing as earth (a whole - composition of things), or just the components that make it appear whole? Is any true form a composite of things? As in sun-ness. As in, there would be no such thing (form) as sun-ness, but only round-ness, hot-ness, bright-ness, etc. But to know the sun, the form of sun-ness must develop, which we (humans) create. But was the possibility of the creation of sun-ness (innate) in nature? (remember Keane's example of the possible form of boat being within nature in the form of log, though the log, being a composite of things would also not be a true form in this example) Does sun-ness exist only for humans? Can the sun exist without sun-ness? We only create sun-ness to know it
(?) Or was there a blueprint in nature to create sun-ness (the composition of other forms is part of the blueprint)? If there wasn't a blueprint, it was a mere matter of chance it (the sun in our solar system) came about. If this is true, the same can be said about humanity (the sun is required for our existence). (I know, I am starting to talk about design, which most of you, if not all, dispell). Something coming to be by chance, I will refer to as coming to be by mistake. Do mistakes stop happening when we willfully create forms of things (bringing together a composition of other forms, as in refrigerator)? Or are all of these possibilities already in nature (the possibility of refrigerator)? If so, why are these possibilities in nature? (by mistake?) Why do humans have the ability to stop everything that manifests (new manifestations, refrigerators) from being a mistake? Is it a mistake that we have this ability? If the potential for us to stop the manifestation of mistakes exists (sun was mistake, frige was not), it existed in nature (even if it was a mistake). It existed before us. It could have happened before us. But it didn't. Why? The universe always held the possibility of creating new forms, but needed the proper medium to come up, by mistake, to do so? If this medium is a mistake, it may never have developed. Why then have the possibility of new forms, without a sure medium to make them manifest? These possibilities could also be mistakes, but at least the possibility of stopping mistakes (frige) existed before us within nature, and any possibility existing before the medium it needs to come to fruition must exist on some plane absent of the medium.
I think more can be fleshed out from this, but I'll leave it at that for now.
(?) Or was there a blueprint in nature to create sun-ness (the composition of other forms is part of the blueprint)? If there wasn't a blueprint, it was a mere matter of chance it (the sun in our solar system) came about. If this is true, the same can be said about humanity (the sun is required for our existence). (I know, I am starting to talk about design, which most of you, if not all, dispell). Something coming to be by chance, I will refer to as coming to be by mistake. Do mistakes stop happening when we willfully create forms of things (bringing together a composition of other forms, as in refrigerator)? Or are all of these possibilities already in nature (the possibility of refrigerator)? If so, why are these possibilities in nature? (by mistake?) Why do humans have the ability to stop everything that manifests (new manifestations, refrigerators) from being a mistake? Is it a mistake that we have this ability? If the potential for us to stop the manifestation of mistakes exists (sun was mistake, frige was not), it existed in nature (even if it was a mistake). It existed before us. It could have happened before us. But it didn't. Why? The universe always held the possibility of creating new forms, but needed the proper medium to come up, by mistake, to do so? If this medium is a mistake, it may never have developed. Why then have the possibility of new forms, without a sure medium to make them manifest? These possibilities could also be mistakes, but at least the possibility of stopping mistakes (frige) existed before us within nature, and any possibility existing before the medium it needs to come to fruition must exist on some plane absent of the medium.
I think more can be fleshed out from this, but I'll leave it at that for now.
Monday, February 16, 2009
All is One and All is Many
All of these deductions/arguments argue in one way or another for the one being one and/or many (and one being not one and/or not many), showing that someone can logically argue that oneness and multiplicity co-exist in every facet of the universe. It doesn't seem to me that Parmenides only wishes to argue for one underlying principle in the universe (oneness), but also wishes to show, aside from showing that all is one, that all is also many (and one). There is also a change in the context in which one is used throughout the deductions; at times one is used to represent one object, and other times one is used to describe the universe as a whole. If each object can be one and many, and the universe is one and many, this could also be seen as an attempt to describe the microcosm-macrocosm connection, in which each component of the universe mirrors the universe as a whole through their nature (oneness and manyness). Perhaps it is an attempt to explain the possibility of a pantheistic monism. All is one through the essence of oneness, and this one expresses itself in many ways (all is many).
Monday, February 9, 2009
Trees and Tables
Back to the table... This is a possibility that came to mind: the wood (or tree) has an unhuman made Form (and can therefore be referred to as natural - I am also defining natural/artificial through this), and the table has a human made Form (and is therefore artificial). The (prehuman existing) mental (thought/conscious) element of the Form is in the wood/tree, within which there is a mental bluprint, and mental atom-like things to solidify/manifest the wood/tree. The table exists as a human manipulation (unnatural) of the Form of the wood/tree. I am working this around the notions described in Timaeus (and elsewhere). Thought must travel through a receptacle for something to manifest. One is dependent on the other, as can be seen in Parmenides explanation of the one and being. One is dependent on being, and being dependent on one (one is analogous to thought, and being to receptacle, or vice-versa; it doesn't really matter, no pun intended). The Form is thought which must travel through receptacle, of which the nature is partially the blueprint of the Form and the thinking atom-like things described above. The receptacle is molding-like-stuff to manifest thought/Forms, and also contains the potential for other thinking beings (humans) to mold what it contains (i.e. humans manipulating wood to mold a table). Whether through the nonhuman mind, within which is the realm of Forms (trees), or through the mind of humans (tables), the object exists as thought prior to being manifest.
Sunday, February 1, 2009
Madness
As Socrates catches himself making a "foolish and close to impious speech" for the sake of rhetorical prowess, and begins the speech in argument for the one in love (philosophical love), he still permits the idea of love being a sort of madness, agreed upon early in the dialogue, and says "the best things we have come from madness, when it is given as a gift of the god. (Does Socrates think there is any kind of madness that is not a gift from the god?) He proceeds to speak of four kinds of madness, all with positive connotations. The first one being prophets, the second kind I am unsure of what he is referring to (244E), perhaps priests (?), the third poets and musicians, and the fourth being love, which must be proven to be provided "by the gods to ensure our greatest fortune." Why provided by the gods? Because only madness provided by the gods provides good fortune (if there is any other kind of madness)? Though unsure of how the word madness translates and it is an ambigious term to begin with, it is interesting to find these positions attributed to madness. When Socrates speaks of madness it appears he means the one influenced is not entirely in control of one's actions, as in the prophet and poet are mediums through which the gods create positive (as in extended) imprints on the human world, for the benefit of humans. When madness is involved, is there a motive, and is the motive always the same? If love is seen as a madness, and the lover is a medium for the gods, the motive seems to be to have the lover recognize the Form of Beauty, and aspire towards the realm of Forms, the soul, and unite with its origin/source; which could be argued (purpose of the idea of reincarnation/transcending to return) is the aim of all creation, and the god (s) itself. Could the other forms of madness be seen to have the same motive?
Sunday, January 25, 2009
Phaedrus
During the second speech, when Socrates begins describing the nature of the soul, there are strikingly similar images to my mind as that of angels, especially when he mentions the development of wings. Of course I keep in mind that he mentions prior that he will describe this situation in metaphor (what it is like), at least according to the footnote (246A). Though I wonder if this is a partial inspiration for the angelic images found throughout Christian literature/thought. I am also curious if the angels referred to in the Old Testament (the Jewish angelic hierarchy could have also been inspired by Babylonian/Zoroastrian concepts which may have surfaced a few hundred years before Plato) appeared before Phaedrus. I'm willing to bet that concepts of the divine coupled with the notion of wings appeared before Plato conjured up this idea. This also brings to question as to whether Plato considers the soul (or whatever one wants to call it) divine. Within his metaphorical analysis of the soul, it appears one's soul can be either bodily or divine, and this at least draws a distinction between two states (which the soul can adhere to). He explains the struggle a soul goes through when encountering a situation (love) that can swing the soul in either direction (to the body or the divine) depending on the labor and will of the driver of the soul. This concept is central to the mysteries, and laboring to unite one's soul with the divine, rather than the body is the aim of the initiate. This tells me that, even if the overarching theme of this dialogue is rhetoric or education, this tale about the immortal soul and how to shift it toward the divine in such a confusing situation as love is no less important, at least for initiates (Plato and others). And to shift the dialogue to a theme of rhetoric, may have been strategic for the majority (non-initiates) to easily latch onto and undermine the philosophic love speech.
Monday, December 8, 2008
Observations from film watched in class
I found it interesting that one guy made a comment about language being closely tied to consciousness, as it gives us the ability to have thoughts of our thoughts? Would we not be able to examine our thoughts if we didn't have a language? I know that quite frequently I have a thought that I am able to comprehend without being able to put it into words. One might suggest I am not really able to comprehend it, or as well as I think, if I cannot put it into words, but I think this is bullshit. Our consciousness has the ability to take the objective world in and make sense of it without explaining to itself (in words) what it is that it is entertaining. We see this in animals. Surely those animals that are able to comprehend some of their surroundings (i.e. the ability to remember the need for a tool to crack a nut open) is done without the animal talking in the type of language that is implied (built on a foundation of words with attributed meanings). Its consciousness is communicating to itself, but in a way that is beyond words.
In one experiment it was suggested that the chimp being tested was able to know what was in a human's mind. The chimp knew that a key was needed to open a box, and it knew that the guy wanted to open the box, and therefore showed the guy where they key was put. I just needed to type (think) this out to understand what was meant by claiming the chimp knew what was in the human's mind. Though it is likely the chimp only knew this through repitition, because the whole experiment was around the box being opened. The chimp always knew that the second man that came into the room would open the box, because that is what the man always did. Therefore this knowledge was drilled in the chimp's mind through repitition. What useful information does this tell us about a chimp's mind? Such experiments seem to be a waste of energy and resources.
As was mentioned in the film, I think it is most fascinating to know that nonhuman animal minds are different and unique from each other and from humans, andit is unnecessary to think of them as or prove them to be deficient human minds. Experimenting with them may do nothing but allow us to marvel when they might show they are capable of something we were unsure they were capable of and at the difference from humans. We should already treat all living beings with respect and fulfill obligations to them when able, and not have to understand their consciousness more before we do so.
In one experiment it was suggested that the chimp being tested was able to know what was in a human's mind. The chimp knew that a key was needed to open a box, and it knew that the guy wanted to open the box, and therefore showed the guy where they key was put. I just needed to type (think) this out to understand what was meant by claiming the chimp knew what was in the human's mind. Though it is likely the chimp only knew this through repitition, because the whole experiment was around the box being opened. The chimp always knew that the second man that came into the room would open the box, because that is what the man always did. Therefore this knowledge was drilled in the chimp's mind through repitition. What useful information does this tell us about a chimp's mind? Such experiments seem to be a waste of energy and resources.
As was mentioned in the film, I think it is most fascinating to know that nonhuman animal minds are different and unique from each other and from humans, andit is unnecessary to think of them as or prove them to be deficient human minds. Experimenting with them may do nothing but allow us to marvel when they might show they are capable of something we were unsure they were capable of and at the difference from humans. We should already treat all living beings with respect and fulfill obligations to them when able, and not have to understand their consciousness more before we do so.
Thursday, December 4, 2008
Significance of Nonhuman Animal Consciousness
It is undeniable that many animals have some cognitive abilities, and are conscious to some extent of their surroundings and actions, but what significance does this knowledge have in terms of human treatment towards animals? It may seem amazing that an animal can crack open a nut through the same means over and over, or draw termites out of a tree with a stick, and then eat them off of the stick, but does it only seem amazing because they already appear so inferior than humans that any cognitive ability we observe from them makes us amazed? Is it really more amazing than the fact that they actually exist? I'm not sure any of these cognitive abilities we observe in them warrents any change humans treatment towards them. Of course I am assuming that they receive the general concern and care that they deserve by being living beings, and there is certainly a lot of unwarrented cruelty towards animals. I am referring mostly to consumption of animals for food as warrented human treatment. Come to think of it, this may be the only issue that I'm not sure should change given any recognized cognitive abilities. Whether it is known they have consciousness or cognitive abilities or not, I do not think animals should be subject to experiments, hunting for sport, or stolen from their environment for the entertainment of humans, apparent in zoos and circuses. I consider these acts of cruelty that no living being should be subject to, given the possibility that they may be consciously harmed from such actions. However, if a pig is known to have fairly highly advanced cognitive abilities relative to other nonhuman animals, I see nothing wrong in killing it for food if it will provide sustenance to humans.
Sunday, November 30, 2008
Eating the Unknown
When children first begin to eat meat, do they realize that they are eating an animal? And whether they do or not, does this constitute as their first encounter (assuming they haven't encountered pets) with an animal? I doubt children are aware of what they are eating during there first few years. And therefore it might not be considered their first encounter with an animal, assuming their consciousness must play a role in the encounter. I'm not sure what implications any of this had, it is just something that came up.
When do people become aware of what they are eating? Because of being disattached from what we eat by having others kill, grow and prepare our food for us, many never know exactly what they are eating. We obviously become aware of foods, but much is prepared with ingredients we are not aware of. What we may call a chicken nugget is usually much more than a nugget of chicken. Of course many have also become aware of this, and wish to know what they put into their bodies, hence the movement towards organic foods, etc. This is a great reaction to chemically induced, mass produced foods, however, it is not always accessible and affordable. And I wonder whether it is necessary for everyone to adopt this way of eating. Organic foods are healthier, but many have survived quite easily without eating organic. And more than half of the world's human population is malnurished. Almost everyone of those persons would take any parcel of food available to them, organic or processed to shit. While I think people who can afford to shift their attention towards eating healthier, organic, etc. should do so, as one should take care of their own bodies first, I also think the world as an entirety should put more energy into feeding fellow humans. The two can be done simultaneously, but it is important that people eat before they eat as healthy as possible. Or not; maybe hunger and starvation has a necessary role in the cleansing of the overpopulation of humans on the planet.
When do people become aware of what they are eating? Because of being disattached from what we eat by having others kill, grow and prepare our food for us, many never know exactly what they are eating. We obviously become aware of foods, but much is prepared with ingredients we are not aware of. What we may call a chicken nugget is usually much more than a nugget of chicken. Of course many have also become aware of this, and wish to know what they put into their bodies, hence the movement towards organic foods, etc. This is a great reaction to chemically induced, mass produced foods, however, it is not always accessible and affordable. And I wonder whether it is necessary for everyone to adopt this way of eating. Organic foods are healthier, but many have survived quite easily without eating organic. And more than half of the world's human population is malnurished. Almost everyone of those persons would take any parcel of food available to them, organic or processed to shit. While I think people who can afford to shift their attention towards eating healthier, organic, etc. should do so, as one should take care of their own bodies first, I also think the world as an entirety should put more energy into feeding fellow humans. The two can be done simultaneously, but it is important that people eat before they eat as healthy as possible. Or not; maybe hunger and starvation has a necessary role in the cleansing of the overpopulation of humans on the planet.
Sunday, November 23, 2008
Q's
If science can give scientific explanations for the origins of ethics, etc., does this render theological explanations as useless or impossible? I ask this question pertaining to anything actually. Does a scientific explanation of anything render all theological explanations of that situation as something not worth bothering with? Is it possible that scientfic explanations are a component within something greater than science itself and beyond what science can explain? Is science limited, or is it possible for science to explain every phenomenon present to consciousness? As far as ethics, is it possible that the possible origins of stemming from social evolution was inevitable in the blueprint of the development potential within consciousness? What I mean is that humans reaching the state of ethical development was an inevitable step in the unfolding of the universe.
Tuesday, November 18, 2008
Widening the Gap
This is something that came to me after Christina pointed out our lack of equal treatment to domesticated animals: If a domesticated animal (dog) does something harmful (i.e. pitbull biting a human), is there some lawful punishment the dog can be given so it will not commit the act again other than putting it to death? If it were a human, other things could be done, such as send the human to a correctional facility, because the human has the potential to reason out his/her wrongdoings and change his/her behavior. If a human commits assault, there is a lawful punishment. I don't think we can create laws to punish animals other than having them be put to death. Perhaps there are training schools out there, that I am unaware of, that can train the dogs to become less aggressive, but we have no guarentee that the dog willl not perform the harmful act again. Perhaps the owner or trainer of the animal should be punished for not being in control of the animal it is responsible for. I love dogs as much as anyone, I just see the gap between animals and humans widening here in the fact that we can create laws for ourselves and hold ourselves accountable for our actions, and learn about our behaviour and change it through laws, which animals cannot do, nor can we do it for them.
On another note, something that animals can do, which humans cannot, was pointed out by Noah, which also widens this gap. It is impossible for humans to find an ecological niche, as we are always rapidly evolving and adapting to our surroundings. While every other species finds a niche in their habitat in which their obligations are already set and they are expected to behave in a specific manner. Humans can not find their place and get comfortable with it and have a routine of actions, as every other species can and does. Last week it was mud huts and hunting for food and this week it is a condo suite on the 40th floor of a downtown skyscraper and Chinese take out; who knows what will be next week. This appears to me to be a drastic difference between humans and every other species. How come every other species has their niche, while humans do not? Why can other species not evolve to develop the ability of reason in which they would use to forever progress themselves? Instead, they just waltz along in the backround, and sometimes we observe to take in their beauty.
On another note, something that animals can do, which humans cannot, was pointed out by Noah, which also widens this gap. It is impossible for humans to find an ecological niche, as we are always rapidly evolving and adapting to our surroundings. While every other species finds a niche in their habitat in which their obligations are already set and they are expected to behave in a specific manner. Humans can not find their place and get comfortable with it and have a routine of actions, as every other species can and does. Last week it was mud huts and hunting for food and this week it is a condo suite on the 40th floor of a downtown skyscraper and Chinese take out; who knows what will be next week. This appears to me to be a drastic difference between humans and every other species. How come every other species has their niche, while humans do not? Why can other species not evolve to develop the ability of reason in which they would use to forever progress themselves? Instead, they just waltz along in the backround, and sometimes we observe to take in their beauty.
Tuesday, November 11, 2008
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2008/10/clean-energy-2030.html
http://www.google.com/corporate/green/energy/
This may be old news, but its new to me (thanks Ben Todd), and encouraging news all should here, considering the negative shit we are lambasted with from the mainstream media. I still think, considering the environmental situation, among other things, all is going to hell, but this is the kind of thing I want to see before it all comes down. I want to see great effort from the human heart and mind to rise above greed and pride, and do what we can to salvage some of our greatness, before it all goes under.
When Murray Bookchin suggested we need to evolve into a "free nature" in which humans "intervene in the natural evolution", it was natural for me to throw up a red flag. But considering we've already intervened in the natural evolution to a point where we are facing the destruction of our own species, among others, we might as well intervene some more to attempt to patch the rotten sore on mother earth we've created, rather then letting her do it by herself (which I am confident that she inevitably will do if need be).
Bookchin also states that communal interest must be placed above personal interest in his ecological society. I think that if everyone took care of themselves and put their energy into that which is in direct relations to them on a daily basis, it will follow that the collective will benefit as a whole. The problem is people don't take care of themselves first, and they put their energy into concerns out of their reach, when the root of these problems lies within each of us and the way we perceive the world and conduct ourselves on a daily basis.
http://www.google.com/corporate/green/energy/
This may be old news, but its new to me (thanks Ben Todd), and encouraging news all should here, considering the negative shit we are lambasted with from the mainstream media. I still think, considering the environmental situation, among other things, all is going to hell, but this is the kind of thing I want to see before it all comes down. I want to see great effort from the human heart and mind to rise above greed and pride, and do what we can to salvage some of our greatness, before it all goes under.
When Murray Bookchin suggested we need to evolve into a "free nature" in which humans "intervene in the natural evolution", it was natural for me to throw up a red flag. But considering we've already intervened in the natural evolution to a point where we are facing the destruction of our own species, among others, we might as well intervene some more to attempt to patch the rotten sore on mother earth we've created, rather then letting her do it by herself (which I am confident that she inevitably will do if need be).
Bookchin also states that communal interest must be placed above personal interest in his ecological society. I think that if everyone took care of themselves and put their energy into that which is in direct relations to them on a daily basis, it will follow that the collective will benefit as a whole. The problem is people don't take care of themselves first, and they put their energy into concerns out of their reach, when the root of these problems lies within each of us and the way we perceive the world and conduct ourselves on a daily basis.
Sunday, November 9, 2008
Anti-Sentience
If sentience is the capacity for pain and pleasure, are those who advocate for the practice of remaining indifferent to pain and pleasure, so to transcend the effects of the mundane, physical world (i.e. Eastern mystics) anti-sentient? If sentience is then taken out of the equation of determining which living beings should be given ethical consideration, does this make all nonhumans more like humans, or does it separate humans from nonhumans even more? Would the non-sentient still give sentient creatures consideration because sentient creatures are unaware of the deluded nature of pain and plasure, or would s/he give them less consideration because s/he sees pain and pleasure as fleeting illusions, as it would not matter if they received one or the other, and whatever happens to them, happens? Because humans alone can grasp this, and become indifferent to pain and pleasure, does this create a larger gap between humans and nonnhumans? Would this ability make humans superior, because they can avoid these disturbances?
Thursday, November 6, 2008
Biosphere as Human Dominion
Murray Bookchin argues for an ethics in which "humans complement nonhuman beings to produce a developmental whole - not as dominant species but as a supportive one." Can humans be a supportive species while also being a dominant one? The act of willfully supporting nonhumans is an act of domination in the sense of excersing a power over other species that they do not have. Sure, other nonhumans support humans, but they don't take the initiative to do this willfully. Perhaps, humans are obligated to support nonhumans, being a dominant species. Again, it is humans who need to make the recognition of support to all species, and this could be because everything else is within their domain; and in their domain, because humans alone can willfully cause help or harm to the whole. The ability to do this would come from the development of our "second nature" as we evolved into social beings, according to Bookchin. And to agree with what I said about our ability alone to help or harm the whole, Bookchin says our second nature "contains both the danger of tearing down the biosphere and, given a further development of humanity toward an ecological society, the capacity to provide an entirely new ecological dispensation." (pg 468) Whether true or not, perhaps humans need to see the biosphere as their dominion in order to take the steps necessary to preserve it. I am not speaking of a dominion in the sense that we can do anything to whatever lies within it because it belongs to us, but more that it is our responsibility alone to take care of it in order to preserve it for our existence and the existence of everything else within it that is a vital component of its preservation and component of its beauty and uniqeness.
Sunday, November 2, 2008
Climate Change at Walden Pond
http://dsc.discovery.com/news/2008/10/28/walden-pond-flowers.html
Here is an interesting article about the effects of climate change in the woods at Walden Pond, where Thoreau lived while writing Walden. The temperature here has increased 4.3 degrees Fahrenheit, and 27% of the species Thoreau documented cannot be found there anymore and another 36% may be gone soon.
Thoreau often stated that in nature could be found the most sublime society. As far as the society humans have devleoped today, Bookchin says, "social development... often becomes more problematical for themselves and nonhuman life." The findings in the above article show, in one sense, this quote to be true.
Here is an interesting article about the effects of climate change in the woods at Walden Pond, where Thoreau lived while writing Walden. The temperature here has increased 4.3 degrees Fahrenheit, and 27% of the species Thoreau documented cannot be found there anymore and another 36% may be gone soon.
Thoreau often stated that in nature could be found the most sublime society. As far as the society humans have devleoped today, Bookchin says, "social development... often becomes more problematical for themselves and nonhuman life." The findings in the above article show, in one sense, this quote to be true.
Tuesday, October 28, 2008
Fencing the Atmosphere?
I find it interesting (and sad) that humans will likely show more concern towards the natural environment, out of necessity for survival, before humans show more consideration towards each other because of prejudicial attitudes toward sex, race, religion, etc.
Quote from Terry Anderson/Donald Leal: "If free market environmentalism solutions spark the imagination of environmental entrepreneurs, technological progress toward fencing the atmosphere may be accelerated." --They can't be serious. Why? To hope environmental organizations will purchase the entire atmosphere, so to eliminate the pollution of it? And how? Is it even possible to mark and divide portions of the atmosphere? And the entire atmosphere would have to be purchased from the beginning of it being available on the market from environmentalists; because if say half was owned by environmentalists, and half was owned by corporations which pollute, the pollution would surely move from one portion of the atmosphere to another with wind currents. And it certainly isn't possible to construct physical walls (fences?) to ensure pollutants don't travel into someone's elses property. (Which brings me to a thought: pollutants travel quite far from their source into areas that are privately owned. Shouldn't these polluters be held responsible for that?). Perhaps I am misunderstanding what Anderson/Leal mean by fencing the atmosphere and my response is only good for some laughs. But if that is not what they mean, what do they mean when talking about fencing the atmosphere?
Quote from Terry Anderson/Donald Leal: "If free market environmentalism solutions spark the imagination of environmental entrepreneurs, technological progress toward fencing the atmosphere may be accelerated." --They can't be serious. Why? To hope environmental organizations will purchase the entire atmosphere, so to eliminate the pollution of it? And how? Is it even possible to mark and divide portions of the atmosphere? And the entire atmosphere would have to be purchased from the beginning of it being available on the market from environmentalists; because if say half was owned by environmentalists, and half was owned by corporations which pollute, the pollution would surely move from one portion of the atmosphere to another with wind currents. And it certainly isn't possible to construct physical walls (fences?) to ensure pollutants don't travel into someone's elses property. (Which brings me to a thought: pollutants travel quite far from their source into areas that are privately owned. Shouldn't these polluters be held responsible for that?). Perhaps I am misunderstanding what Anderson/Leal mean by fencing the atmosphere and my response is only good for some laughs. But if that is not what they mean, what do they mean when talking about fencing the atmosphere?
Thursday, October 23, 2008
Some Questions
Does meat sell products for men only? Can it not sell for women too? I'd like to see the statistics... but I imagine women eat meat just as much as men do. There can't be significantly less women who eat meat than there is men. I don't see the connection between men and meateaters. Men might traditionally kill the animals, but they are not the only ones who eat their kill. I find it interesting that it was noted that plant-based economies are more egalatarian. Do men discriminate more against women when they are eating more meat? I find this hard to believe. But if it so, what is the connection? Eating meat provokes discrimanate behavior?
Do most human meateaters think that they (humans) are more superior than animals, and this is why they don't eat humans? Too most humans, I would think it is obvious that it is taboo to eat humans; but why? Is this the case with other species who are carnivores? Do they also not eat their own kind? Perhaps it is because of the sentimentality other species have towards their own kind. If this is so, perhaps every conscious species recognizes a difference between their own species and every other. Perhaps every species has a mentality of survival, not only within each individual for itself, but for its own kind as well as for itself, and therefore only survives off species that are not of its kind.
I found this following comment that was made in class interesting: If a man is gay, he would reject meat. If he hasn't rejected meat, he hasn't made the connection yet. Maybe I misheard something, but I don't know where to begin to try to understand this. As above, is eating meat associated with being a man, or masculine? And are homosexual men always considered to be feminate, and to associate themselves with anything masculine would be a misunderstanding on their own part of the way they should behave for being homosexual?
Do most human meateaters think that they (humans) are more superior than animals, and this is why they don't eat humans? Too most humans, I would think it is obvious that it is taboo to eat humans; but why? Is this the case with other species who are carnivores? Do they also not eat their own kind? Perhaps it is because of the sentimentality other species have towards their own kind. If this is so, perhaps every conscious species recognizes a difference between their own species and every other. Perhaps every species has a mentality of survival, not only within each individual for itself, but for its own kind as well as for itself, and therefore only survives off species that are not of its kind.
I found this following comment that was made in class interesting: If a man is gay, he would reject meat. If he hasn't rejected meat, he hasn't made the connection yet. Maybe I misheard something, but I don't know where to begin to try to understand this. As above, is eating meat associated with being a man, or masculine? And are homosexual men always considered to be feminate, and to associate themselves with anything masculine would be a misunderstanding on their own part of the way they should behave for being homosexual?
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