Monday, February 16, 2009
All is One and All is Many
All of these deductions/arguments argue in one way or another for the one being one and/or many (and one being not one and/or not many), showing that someone can logically argue that oneness and multiplicity co-exist in every facet of the universe. It doesn't seem to me that Parmenides only wishes to argue for one underlying principle in the universe (oneness), but also wishes to show, aside from showing that all is one, that all is also many (and one). There is also a change in the context in which one is used throughout the deductions; at times one is used to represent one object, and other times one is used to describe the universe as a whole. If each object can be one and many, and the universe is one and many, this could also be seen as an attempt to describe the microcosm-macrocosm connection, in which each component of the universe mirrors the universe as a whole through their nature (oneness and manyness). Perhaps it is an attempt to explain the possibility of a pantheistic monism. All is one through the essence of oneness, and this one expresses itself in many ways (all is many).
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4 comments:
This is an interesting take on the meaningfulness behind the claim that all is both one and many. I originally assumed this problem was from the result of an ambiguity in language, and having to do with epistemology more than metaphysics.
The surface level ambiguities were addressed informally when Parmenides critically analyzes the hypotheses. I will not go through all the interpretations but the most obvious ambiguity is with the term “all,” which can mean either “everything” or “every thing.” There is a deeper ambiguity with the term “one” that I believe is a result from the nature of knowledge.
An individual only knows a thing by its relation to other things. For example, we know the Earth because of what is on it, what it is made of, and where it is in relation to other things. We conceptually combine all these into one thing: the idea of the Earth. I believe this is true for anything in the realm of knowledge, be it a noun, concept, or self-identity.
The ambiguity with the term “one” arises because of this. “One” connotes the complete individuality of an entity from everything but itself. However, it is impossible to understand the one entity by itself, because we only know it in relation to other things. So to conceive one thing is really to conceive of anything but the one thing. This is why a tautology does provide anything meaningful.
Nicely put, Kyle. However, isn't it likely to be the case that the earth, for example, is considerably more than the random association of the many parts that we conceputally frame as "earth"? As we learn more about the integry of ecosystems and how these function at various scales, there does seem to be a robust and extra-conceptual sense in which the earth is, objectively, a "one."
Ben's "pantheistic monism" does sound very Parmenidean (or perhaps a Platonic reading of Parmenides, which might be even better than the original!). Metaphysically, I'm not sure something like this paradoxical formulation ("oneness expressing itself in many ways") isn't the only live possibility for the nature of what is.
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