Where are the Forms?

Arriving at knowledge through:

1. Perception

2. Developing in account (through the faculty of reason, see 185d and 186d)

3. Making a judgement

(notice how Kant claimed the same when reconciling empiricism with rationalism)

What is to say the above method is not the means to 'recollect' knowledge of the Forms?
I understand this method can be used to attain 'knowledge of convention' (mentioned by Matt), of which the forms are non-transcendental, but, again, what is to say this method cannot by applied to recollect the transcendent forms Plato mentions in his earlier dialogues, such as justice.

Does one begin to possess knowledge upon going through this method, and then 'has' or recollects it upon perceiving again (sensory or mentally) and recalling the judgement made, or does one possess knowledge prior to this method, and then recollects that knowledge when applying this method, and 'has' it everytime a perception is made (with the judgement)? (see198d)

Questions

Just to clarify:

First Socrates says (though he openly says that he is not claiming that these are his views) everything is in motion in the sense that everything is becoming (in two forms: passively or actively)(156-157):

Is something considered to be in motion when it is producing something to be perceived (i.e. whiteness)? Though this thing needs a perceiver to produce something to be perceived? What is perceived is always becoming for the perceiver, and what is perceiving is always becoming for what is perceived? Can something become in some way without being perceived (i.e. metal turning to rust). (This makes me curious as to what Berkeley thought about becoming as opposed to being; "to be is to be perceived", but is perception required to become?)

Later on he says there are two forms of motion: alteration and spatial movement. (181d)

Is motion referred to as becoming the same thing implied as alteration? Or are both processes of becoming?

It is interesting to note, that though everything is in motion, everything relies on two factors (passive = percipient and active = perception) to seemingly exist (or be in the state of becoming). If one of the the factors is missing, then nothing exists (?) This again seems similar to Berkeley's line of thinking. As in a rock could not move/become without providing a perception, and if it is not becoming, it is not, because everything is becoming (?) And I again ask, can anything become without being perceived or perceiving? It doesn't seem that this line of thought that Socrates brings up would allow for it.

The whole concept an active and passive factor dependent on each other to exist, "And through the intercourse and mutual friction of these two there comes to be an offspring infinite in multitude..." (156b) is very similar to what is partially being explained in Timaeus.

As far as the spatial movement goes, Socrates asks how can one ever name (or perhaps even know?) something if it is always in motion? Though something is becoming, it may be moving in slow vibrations, slow enough for one to apply a name, and develop knowledge about it, while it is in the process of becoming.

String of Thought

A series of thoughts I had from last class: Is there such a thing as earth (a whole - composition of things), or just the components that make it appear whole? Is any true form a composite of things? As in sun-ness. As in, there would be no such thing (form) as sun-ness, but only round-ness, hot-ness, bright-ness, etc. But to know the sun, the form of sun-ness must develop, which we (humans) create. But was the possibility of the creation of sun-ness (innate) in nature? (remember Keane's example of the possible form of boat being within nature in the form of log, though the log, being a composite of things would also not be a true form in this example) Does sun-ness exist only for humans? Can the sun exist without sun-ness? We only create sun-ness to know it
(?) Or was there a blueprint in nature to create sun-ness (the composition of other forms is part of the blueprint)? If there wasn't a blueprint, it was a mere matter of chance it (the sun in our solar system) came about. If this is true, the same can be said about humanity (the sun is required for our existence). (I know, I am starting to talk about design, which most of you, if not all, dispell). Something coming to be by chance, I will refer to as coming to be by mistake. Do mistakes stop happening when we willfully create forms of things (bringing together a composition of other forms, as in refrigerator)? Or are all of these possibilities already in nature (the possibility of refrigerator)? If so, why are these possibilities in nature? (by mistake?) Why do humans have the ability to stop everything that manifests (new manifestations, refrigerators) from being a mistake? Is it a mistake that we have this ability? If the potential for us to stop the manifestation of mistakes exists (sun was mistake, frige was not), it existed in nature (even if it was a mistake). It existed before us. It could have happened before us. But it didn't. Why? The universe always held the possibility of creating new forms, but needed the proper medium to come up, by mistake, to do so? If this medium is a mistake, it may never have developed. Why then have the possibility of new forms, without a sure medium to make them manifest? These possibilities could also be mistakes, but at least the possibility of stopping mistakes (frige) existed before us within nature, and any possibility existing before the medium it needs to come to fruition must exist on some plane absent of the medium.

I think more can be fleshed out from this, but I'll leave it at that for now.

All is One and All is Many

All of these deductions/arguments argue in one way or another for the one being one and/or many (and one being not one and/or not many), showing that someone can logically argue that oneness and multiplicity co-exist in every facet of the universe. It doesn't seem to me that Parmenides only wishes to argue for one underlying principle in the universe (oneness), but also wishes to show, aside from showing that all is one, that all is also many (and one). There is also a change in the context in which one is used throughout the deductions; at times one is used to represent one object, and other times one is used to describe the universe as a whole. If each object can be one and many, and the universe is one and many, this could also be seen as an attempt to describe the microcosm-macrocosm connection, in which each component of the universe mirrors the universe as a whole through their nature (oneness and manyness). Perhaps it is an attempt to explain the possibility of a pantheistic monism. All is one through the essence of oneness, and this one expresses itself in many ways (all is many).

Trees and Tables

Back to the table... This is a possibility that came to mind: the wood (or tree) has an unhuman made Form (and can therefore be referred to as natural - I am also defining natural/artificial through this), and the table has a human made Form (and is therefore artificial). The (prehuman existing) mental (thought/conscious) element of the Form is in the wood/tree, within which there is a mental bluprint, and mental atom-like things to solidify/manifest the wood/tree. The table exists as a human manipulation (unnatural) of the Form of the wood/tree. I am working this around the notions described in Timaeus (and elsewhere). Thought must travel through a receptacle for something to manifest. One is dependent on the other, as can be seen in Parmenides explanation of the one and being. One is dependent on being, and being dependent on one (one is analogous to thought, and being to receptacle, or vice-versa; it doesn't really matter, no pun intended). The Form is thought which must travel through receptacle, of which the nature is partially the blueprint of the Form and the thinking atom-like things described above. The receptacle is molding-like-stuff to manifest thought/Forms, and also contains the potential for other thinking beings (humans) to mold what it contains (i.e. humans manipulating wood to mold a table). Whether through the nonhuman mind, within which is the realm of Forms (trees), or through the mind of humans (tables), the object exists as thought prior to being manifest.

Madness

As Socrates catches himself making a "foolish and close to impious speech" for the sake of rhetorical prowess, and begins the speech in argument for the one in love (philosophical love), he still permits the idea of love being a sort of madness, agreed upon early in the dialogue, and says "the best things we have come from madness, when it is given as a gift of the god. (Does Socrates think there is any kind of madness that is not a gift from the god?) He proceeds to speak of four kinds of madness, all with positive connotations. The first one being prophets, the second kind I am unsure of what he is referring to (244E), perhaps priests (?), the third poets and musicians, and the fourth being love, which must be proven to be provided "by the gods to ensure our greatest fortune." Why provided by the gods? Because only madness provided by the gods provides good fortune (if there is any other kind of madness)? Though unsure of how the word madness translates and it is an ambigious term to begin with, it is interesting to find these positions attributed to madness. When Socrates speaks of madness it appears he means the one influenced is not entirely in control of one's actions, as in the prophet and poet are mediums through which the gods create positive (as in extended) imprints on the human world, for the benefit of humans. When madness is involved, is there a motive, and is the motive always the same? If love is seen as a madness, and the lover is a medium for the gods, the motive seems to be to have the lover recognize the Form of Beauty, and aspire towards the realm of Forms, the soul, and unite with its origin/source; which could be argued (purpose of the idea of reincarnation/transcending to return) is the aim of all creation, and the god (s) itself. Could the other forms of madness be seen to have the same motive?

Phaedrus

During the second speech, when Socrates begins describing the nature of the soul, there are strikingly similar images to my mind as that of angels, especially when he mentions the development of wings. Of course I keep in mind that he mentions prior that he will describe this situation in metaphor (what it is like), at least according to the footnote (246A). Though I wonder if this is a partial inspiration for the angelic images found throughout Christian literature/thought. I am also curious if the angels referred to in the Old Testament (the Jewish angelic hierarchy could have also been inspired by Babylonian/Zoroastrian concepts which may have surfaced a few hundred years before Plato) appeared before Phaedrus. I'm willing to bet that concepts of the divine coupled with the notion of wings appeared before Plato conjured up this idea. This also brings to question as to whether Plato considers the soul (or whatever one wants to call it) divine. Within his metaphorical analysis of the soul, it appears one's soul can be either bodily or divine, and this at least draws a distinction between two states (which the soul can adhere to). He explains the struggle a soul goes through when encountering a situation (love) that can swing the soul in either direction (to the body or the divine) depending on the labor and will of the driver of the soul. This concept is central to the mysteries, and laboring to unite one's soul with the divine, rather than the body is the aim of the initiate. This tells me that, even if the overarching theme of this dialogue is rhetoric or education, this tale about the immortal soul and how to shift it toward the divine in such a confusing situation as love is no less important, at least for initiates (Plato and others). And to shift the dialogue to a theme of rhetoric, may have been strategic for the majority (non-initiates) to easily latch onto and undermine the philosophic love speech.